Abstract: This paper examines how institutional trust affects the way in which people process information and perceive risk. Data come from a study of risk perception in the circumstance of US state health department investigations of suspected cancer clusters, with 30 cases examined (n = 1,111). Trust is assessed for three information sources: state health departments, civic groups and industries involved in each case. Higher trust for the state directly predicts lower risk perception, while high trust for civic groups predicts greater risk perception. Perceiving high trust for industry and state -and low trust for civic groups-promotes heuristic processing, which in turn predicts lower risk perception. Alternately, perceiving industry to have low trust and civic groups to have high trust promotes greater systematic processing, which consistently leads to perception of greater risk. Almost all of the effect of industry trust on risk is expressed indirectly.
and community involvement in decisions about environmental and health risks. In this work, she investigates how methods such as public meetings between community members and government officials affect risk perceptions, credibility judgments, satisfaction with outcomes and willingness to engage in future community activities.
Introduction
The recent expansion of scholarly interest in trust has reached into a wide range of more narrowly defined disciplines. Risk communication is one such discipline. Trust is a precious commodity for those communicating risk and perhaps acutely so for industry and governmental risk communicators who are typically considered 'less trustworthy' sources (Fessenden-Raden, Fitchen and Heath, 1987; McCallum, Hammond and Covello, 1991; Slovic, Flynn and Layman, 1991) . Accordingly, trust has become an important concern in studies of risk perception and communication. This study makes an offering to that area of investigation by examining how institutional trust affects the way in which people process information and subsequently perceive risk. In this effort, we integrate three conceptual areas: institutional trust, the psychometric model of risk perception (Slovic, 2000) and Eagly and Chaiken's heuristic-systematic information processing model (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993) .
We will first review these conceptual areas and then offer a rationale for their integration. The resulting model is tested using data from a study of risk communication in the context of US state health department investigations of suspected cancer clusters. The model evaluates the trust of three information sources active in such cases: state health departments, civic groups and industries.
Trust and risk
There has been strong interest in the concept of trust within the risk literature for some time. Such studies typically seek to explain, through a variety of mechanisms, what factors predict or describe the degree of risk that individuals perceive from hazards. Through various approaches a line of studies demonstrate that trust has considerable influence over perception of risk and the function of risk communication. Some have even argued that the only concepts needed to describe risk perception are degree of trust and amount of 'outrage' (Sandman et al., 1993) .
Researchers studying risk have examined general trust, social trust and confidence (Cvetkovich and Löfstedt, 2000; Siegrist, Earle and Gutscher, 2003; Siegrist, Gutscher and Earle, 2005) . They have looked at a range of concepts predicting or being associated with trust, including prior beliefs, risk/benefit ratios, geography, the effect of new information and knowledge and values (Greenberg and Williams, 1999; Siegrist, Cvetkovich and Gutscher, 2001; Siegrist, Cvetkovich and Roth, 2000; Cvetkovich et al., 2002; Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004) . They have examined a variety of contexts including comparison of technologies, comparison of accident events, gene technologies, cancer clusters and electromagnetic fields Siegrist, Cvetkovich and Gutscher, 2001; Siegrist, Earle and Gutscher, 2003; Pidgeon, 2004, 2005; ) . They have looked across cultural and national contrasts (Maeda and Miyahara, 2003; Viklund, 2003) .
With very few exceptions researchers have consistently argued that trust is a significant factor in risk perception. Perhaps the most outspoken critic of the function of trust in risk has been Sjöberg (2001) . He argues that the relationship between trust and risk is only 'weak to moderate' and demonstrates the superiority of attitudes concerning 'unknown effects' of technologies in explaining risk perceptions. While the basis of this argument lies on a fairly demanding expectation of effect size -a correlation of 0.3 in social survey results is fairly strong as such work goes -Sjöberg does nonetheless argue that the concept of trust may perhaps be getting more reflexive praise than it deserves. It is clear that the relationship between trust and risk calls for additional examination, as evidenced by a number of current funding and publication initiatives.
Of the trust-related concepts that have developed in the risk literature, one stands out most strongly. Earle and Cvetkovich have argued, through a number of publications, that for most individuals assessing trust is often overly demanding (Earle and Cvetkovich, 1995; Cvetkovich and Löfstedt, 2000; Cvetkovich et al., 2002; Earle, 2004) . As a consequence, individuals often act as cognitive misers by employing judgmental heuristics or by satisficing in their trust judgments (Simon, 1983; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Messick and Kramier, 2001) .
They argue, with respect to institutional trust, that this tendency is greatest during circumstances in which complicated (e.g. scientific) processes are involved. In such circumstances, individuals simply do not have the cognitive resources to assess their trust of an institution based on factors such as beneficence, competence or honesty. Rather, individuals base their trust of an institution on an assessment of the degree to which the institution shares the individual's values; how similar the individual sees the institution to him or herself. This approach, which Earle and Cvetkovich call Salient Value Similarity, has been shown to be predictive of single-item measurements of trust.
The approach we take in this study for the conceptualisation of trust is quite simple. As in the work of Earle and Cvetovich, we allow for the expression of trust as a native concept amenable to measurement by a single item. We take this approach in order to simplify our approach in a study that is an initial exploration of trust's relation to other developed concepts. As will be described in more detail below, we examine the degree to which individuals report trusting three social institutions that are tied to the context of the investigation.
Risk perception
A considerable amount of research has been published on risk perception, and a variety of theoretical perspectives have been employed, including sociological, psychological and cultural (Krimsky and Golding, 1992) . One of the most fruitful areas of research in risk perception is that which has yielded insight into how people respond to the specific characteristics of various hazards (Morgan, 1993) . To investigate risk perception, researchers surveyed various groups and asked them to respond to a series of questions concerning a broad range of common hazards (Fischhoff et al., 1978) . By measuring variables such as how well a hazard is understood, or how much control an individual has over a risk, the researchers were able to successfully use factor analytic techniques to develop a model showing that reactions to risk can be characterised most compactly in two dimensions -or in a 'risk space' (for an overview see Slovic, 2000) .
One dimension of risk space is termed dread, which relates to the scale of the risk and the degree to which it harms innocent individuals. Nerve gas accidents and nuclear war, e.g., carry high dread while aspirin and swimming pools do not. The second dimension, termed knowledge, involves how well a risk is understood and how observable its consequences are. On one end of this spectrum are risks like electric fields and PCBs; on the other end are automobile accidents. Taken together, looking at risks in these terms can predict how people will react: "Risks carrying a high level of dread, for example, provoke more calls for government intervention than do some more workaday risks that actually cause more deaths or injuries." (Morgan, 1993, p.35) The two-dimensional model which has been in use for a number of years is widely cited, replicated and validated in various countries, including Hungary, France, Japan, Norway and Hong Kong (Englander et al., 1986; Namur and Sornay, 1988; Teigen, Brun and Slovic, 1988; Keown, 1989; Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 1991) . Other researchers have expanded risk space into three dimensions using a variety of attributes such as the number of people affected or the voluntariness of the risk (Morgan et al., 1985; Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1985; Kraus and Slovic, 1988; Mullett et al., 1993) . Nonhuman mortality and transgenerational effects have also been examined as risk perception factors (Hohenemser, 1986) . But the basic two-dimensional (knowledge-dread) premise of this risk perception model has remained robust (Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 1991; Mullett et al., 1993; Trumbo, 1996) . More recent survey work with the model has addressed the question of how it works with single hazards encountered in real life as opposed to the abstract hazards used in the early studies. This work has shown that the risk space model functions well to describe how individuals react to single, real hazards, while providing a reliable set of survey questions for the measurement of this construct (Trumbo, 1996 (Trumbo, , 1999 . Thus, the present study employs this particular psychometric tool for the measurement of risk perception.
The Heuristic-Systematic Model
The Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) holds that individuals process information using systematic and/or heuristic strategies (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993) . Systematic processing occurs when an individual makes a judgment by carefully examining arguments and relates those arguments to information already held. Heuristic processing, on the other hand, occurs when individuals use 'simple decision rules' to help them arrive at a judgment about message validity. Such decision rules might appear as agreement with expert opinion or tendency to agree with consensus.
Individuals may use both processing modes as they work to make a judgment. The primary consequence of processing mode -somewhat parallel to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981) -is that judgments arrived at heuristically tend to be less stable and less tied to subsequent behaviour than judgments arrived at systematically. Eagly and Chaiken describe two general types of processing mode determinants: cognitive and motivational.
The primary cognitive determinant of processing mode is the individual's level of information processing ability. The model assumes that systematic processing is a more demanding activity than is heuristic processing, and thus "systematic processing should be more constrained or disrupted than heuristic processing by situational and individual difference factors that reduce people's abilities for detailed information processing." (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, p.328) The authors point to factors such as time availability and prior knowledge of the topic at hand as influences on information processing. Such factors allow heuristic processing to have a significant influence since it can operate even when conditions related to ability limit the use of more systematic efforts.
The model has two closely related motivational determinants: accuracy motivation and information sufficiency. Motivation is held to be based in a desire to form opinions that are square with relevant facts, although recent manifestations of the theory have expanded upon accuracy motivation to include impression motivation and defense motivation (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla and Chen, 1996) . Information sufficiency is a factor of judgmental confidence, "the degree of confidence a person aspires to attain in a given judgment setting" (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, p.330) . Because people tend to feel uncomfortable when important information needs are unmet, motivation can increase when information sufficiency is not achieved and the individual does not hold the desired level of judgmental confidence.
The conceptual form of the HSM has developed in the literature over the past 20 years or so, and has been supported by a good number of experimental studies. Still, the model is far from 'closed', and researchers continue to refine and expand the model. Researchers are also discovering that the HSM has potential to be adapted to a variety of applied circumstances outside of the laboratory, including the context of risk (Griffin, Dunwoody and Neuwirth, 1999; Meijnders, Midden and Wilke, 2001; Trumbo, 2002; Kahlor et al., 2003; Griffin et al., 2004) .
Integration of trust, information processing and risk perception
Numerous studies (discussed above) have shown that trust influences risk perception and the literature on the HSM shows that trust might function as an information cue affecting systematic and heuristic processing. Additionally, some insight into the logical mechanism involved can be drawn from the role of trust in the very similar elaboration likelihood model. The elaboration likelihood model suggests that trust also influences how individuals think about a message (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981) . For issues of low involvement and sources of high trust, individuals are less motivated or able to process information and will likely fall back on pre-existing attitudes to guide their opinions -akin to heuristic processing. In other words, they seem to accept the information without much thought. In comparison, for issues of low involvement and sources of low trust, individuals are more likely to think about the information, i.e. process it more systematically. Alternatively, for issues of high involvement or when individuals carry much prior knowledge of the issue, they are more motivated and able to process the information. As attitudes become more guided by message content, trust has less of an effect on information processing.
Still, research suggests that however small the effect, for issues of high involvement and high prior knowledge, highly trusted sources may nevertheless encourage more thinking and attitude change, depending primarily on the strength of the arguments (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981) .
In sum, the mechanisms linking trust, information processing and risk perception are likely to be located in motivation, issue involvement, information holding and the effect of message cues. A full investigation of these proposed mechanisms is certainly merited and our initial investigation is a step in that direction. Our model is exploratory in nature and based on the following research question: To what degree does institutional trust express its effect on risk perception through mechanisms of information processing? We may also restate this in terms of the model we will evaluate: In a path model with systematic and heuristic information processing arranged as intervening variables between trust and risk perception, significant indirect effects will be present between trust and risk perception.
Methods
This study is drawn from a larger research effort looking at the risk perception of individuals who live in neighbourhoods or communities in which there is a hazard that is thought by some to be associated with a suspected increase in the area's cancer rate. Such cases are fairly common in the US. One study estimated that approximately 1,200 of such requests were made to the 50 US state health departments in 1997 (Trumbo, 2000a) . Responses to these claims vary among state health agencies, ranging from outright dismissal to careful investigation (Greenberg and Wartenberg, 1991) . Of the cases deemed worthy of careful investigation (about a third), very few (about one percent) typically result in the identification of suspect cancer rates, and almost none result in the determination of a causal link to environmental factors (Kase, 1996) .
To collect data for this study, a mail survey was sent to 100 randomly selected households in each of 30 cancer cluster sites that were selected by monitoring state-level news sources (using the Lexis/Nexis database of state newspapers). Sample sites varied considerably in composition, ranging, e.g. from a rural crossroads (Tebbets, Missouri) to a wealthy suburban area (Beverly Hills, California). Each of the 30 sites included in the study either featured a single hazard or had no specific hazard identified (eight such sites). Identified hazards of concern included landfills, agricultural chemicals, various suspected industrial drinking water contaminations, airborne toxics and one reactor.
There was also considerable variety in the cancers of concern, which included childhood leukemia, brain, lung and breast cancers. The majority of the sites (22) involved a single type of cancer, with the remaining sites involving multiple types.
The boundaries used for sampling followed those in the epidemiological studies described in the news reports. Samples were drawn from an extensive direct marketing database, InfoUSA (Donnelly Marketing, 2005) , that allowed a precise geographic definition of the boundary (e.g. as street-defined polygons or as a radius from the hazard). The mailings were not done simultaneously, but were staggered throughout the field period as new cases were identified (November 2002 -March 2004 . Although mailings were addressed to individuals, any adult member of the household was eligible to complete the survey.
The goal was to collect in each area at least 30 completions in which the respondent indicated awareness of the cancer rate controversy in their area. Respondents who answered that they had never heard of the cancer rate issue did not complete the survey beyond the demographic section. Since the project is centered on measuring perception of cancer rates and associated information processing, individuals who were not aware of the issue could not contribute meaningfully. As many as four mailings and a prompt phone call were used; a small cash incentive was provided (USD 2.00). Adjusted response rates ranged from 35 to 70% (mean 47%, adjusted for bad addresses). The sample size for analysis is 1,111 with the number of responses by site ranging from 26 to 59 (M = 37, SD = 8.7).
The questionnaire we used was based on our previous work on risk perception, on other work using the HSM for collection of survey data involving risk topics, and our previous work with credibility (Trumbo, 1996 (Trumbo, , 1998 (Trumbo, , 1999 (Trumbo, , 2000b (Trumbo, , 2002 McComas and Trumbo, 2001; Trumbo and McComas, 2003) . The same questionnaire was used for each of the 30 sites. Cover letter contents were individualised by site to address the specific hazards and cancers involved.
Trust was measured using a single item. For each of the three information sources, survey respondents were asked:
"The State Department of Health (or civic group or industry involved) is a possible source of information on this issue. Considering what you know, please circle the number between the pair of words that best describes your feelings about information from the State Department of Health."
A five-point scale was provided between the anchors 'can be trusted' and 'can't be trusted'.
Our previous work suggested a set of six questions that might function well in a factor model to assess the degree of systematic and heuristic processing. Each of these questions targets the individual's efforts to acquire and compare information and use seven-point Likert-type scales. Three items were included to address systematic processing:
"When I encounter information about the issue I am likely to stop and think about it; In order to understand the issue of cancer rates, the more viewpoints I get the better; When I encounter information about this issue I read or listen to it even if I don't agree with its perspective." Three items were also included for heuristic:
"My past experiences with other situations like this have made it easier to judge this issue; When I encounter information on this issue, I focus on a few key points; There is more information on this issue than I personally need."
The five risk perception variables we used cover a range of reactions to risk, such as personal impact, control over exposure and concern about effects on future generations. These variables are drawn from the extensive work on risk perception and can be classified as either capturing an aspect of knowledge or dread with respect to the hazard of concern. While previous work has identified at least two dimensions to risk perception, we are relying on this smaller set of questions which were selected to provide a unidimensional measure: "I am exposed to cancer risk by living in this area; I have little or no control over any cancer risk that could be caused by living in this area; The topic of the cancer rate in this area something I am frequently worried about; I am concerned that living in this area poses a cancer risk that extends to future generations; Cancer risk possibly posed by living in this area is increasing."
The survey also included demographic questions on sex, age and whether or not the respondent had even been diagnosed with any form of cancer.
Results
First, descriptive statistics for the sample were produced and analysed for potential bias. The sample is well balanced for gender (53% female) and has a mean age of 52 years (SD = 15, M = 51). Age is significantly higher than the US national average of about 35 years. This is common in survey results but may also be related to concerns about cancer and involvement in local issues, especially those potentially affecting property values. Age does not vary significantly across the sample sites (F = 1.4, p = 0.09) but sex does ( 2 = 52, d.f. = 29, p < 0.01). Two sample sites make the greatest contributions to dependence between place and sex. The Prairie Grove, Arkansas sample is 77% female and the Sierra Vista, Arizona sample is 70% male. It is unknown why these sites are so atypical, although they may simply at the extremes of variance.
The dependence between place and sex is eliminated if these two sites are excluded ( 2 = 37, d.f. = 27, p = 0.10). But since they essentially cancel each other out in the full data set the decision was made to not exclude those locations.
Having ever been diagnosed with cancer was found to be independent of place ( 2 = 37, d.f. = 29, p = 0.15) and sex ( 2 = 0.2, d.f. = 29, p = 0.64). There is a predictable relationship between age and having been diagnosed with cancer, with cancer experiences more common in older respondents (F = 118, d.f. = 1, p < 0.01). Respondents who have had cancer are on average 62 years old vs. 50 years old for those who have not. Overall, 16% of the respondents reported having had a cancer diagnosis. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis. Most of the relationships reported in the matrix are significant and many are quite strong, as would be anticipated by sets of related factor elements. The information in Table 1 is provided to allow for more detailed examination of the relationships among indicator variables.
To examine the characteristics of the risk and processing measures, we first used separate exploratory factor analyses to assess the dimensionality of the latent variables to be modelled. First, the five risk perception variables were entered into an exploratory factor analysis (maximum likelihood extraction, oblique rotation, n = 1,111). Only one factor emerged, with an eigenvalue of 3.2 and 57% of the variance explained (loadings: future risk 0.92, exposed 0.80, increasing 0.79, worried 0.78, control 0.37; 2 goodness of fit = 16, d.f. = 5, p = 0.01). This result resembles previous applications of this measurement device and provides us with good confidence in the dependent variable (Chronbach's = 0.85). Note: Correlations above the diagonal, co-variances below. Means and standard deviations appear on the diagonal (n = 1,111). Trust variables range from 1 = low to 5 = high. Risk and processing variables range from 1 = low to 7 = high. Minimum r significant at p = 0.05 is 0.06; at p = 0.01 is 0.08; at p = 0.001 is 0.10. Table 2 presents the factor analysis of the six variables that comprise information processing. The results show that the variables naturally segregate by processing mode and are uncorrelated. The reliabilities and the factor loadings in this analysis are less robust than those reported above for risk perception (systematic = 0.65, heuristic = 0.36). This is especially so for heuristic processing. In our previous work and in the published work of others who are using this concept -and similar measurementheuristic processing has been difficult to capture. We feel that it is likely that social desirability bias may be a problem with this measure. Individuals may not be comfortable admitting that they formed quick or less than fully informed opinions. While measurement is less than ideal, we have seen in our previous work and will show below that this variable nonetheless has good predictive characteristics with risk perception.
Table 2
Factor analysis of information processing variables (maximum likelihood factoring, oblique rotation, n = 1,111) 
Note: Factor correlation = 0.00, Goodness of fit: 2 = 4.6, d.f. = 4, p = 0.33.
Having examined the characteristics of our measures, we move to the structural model to explore these relationships in concert and to address our research question: does trust affect risk perception via information processing? We performed the analysis using the software package AMOS 4.0. Figure 1 presents the results of the model and an interesting set of relationships. First, information processing predicts risk perception and does so in a manner consistent with our previous work with this model. We have seen consistently over a number of cases that systematic processing has a positive relationship with risk perception while heuristic processing has an inverse relationship.Further, the trust measures for the state health departments and the civic groups both present significant direct paths to risk perception and reflect the opposing valence characteristics of the information processing modes: reporting greater trust for the state health departments suppresses risk perceptions, while reporting greater trust for the civic groups associates with perceptions of greater risk. The trust measures also perform significantly in their prediction of information processing. Here, we see an interesting opposition between trust in civic groups and trust in industries. High trust in civic groups associates positively with systematic processing but negatively with heuristic processing, reinforcing the valence mirroring effect of the processing modes. High trust in industry has the opposite configuration (negative to systematic but positive to heuristic) with the exception of a non-significant direct path to risk perception. Trust for the state health department has a mixed effect, with a nonsignificant relationship toward systematic and a positive relationship toward heuristic. . Two path coefficients are affected by these changes in model specification. The paths from civic and industry trust to heuristic processing become non-significant. Given that it is generally desirable to make use of more than two indicators for a latent variable, we only offer these additional results provisionally.
Since the directional configuration of a path model is always open to question, we also ran the model in a form that had information processing predicting the trust measures and in a form that simply had the processing modes correlated with the trust variables in their prediction of risk perception. The correlational model was statistically equivalent with the model in which processing predicted trust, and the model shown in Figure 1 was stronger than either of the alternates ( 2 = 16, d.f. = 1, p < 0.01). Finally, our analysis asked if significant indirect effects would be present between trust and risk perception in a path model, with the information processing modes arranged as intervening variables between trust and risk perception. AMOS also provides a convenient facility for effects decomposition. Table 3 presents these results, which show that indirect effects are present for two of the trust measures (civic and industry). Trust in civic groups has a mixed profile, with most of the effect on risk being direct. Trust has a mirrored profile for state and industry. For trust in state health department all of the effect is direct, for trust in industry all of the effect is indirect with an even split across the processing modes. For calculation of the significance of decomposed effects see MacKinnon (2002) . Note: All standardised effects significant (p < 0.05) for direct and indirect effects unless italicised (n = 1,111).
Discussion
There are a few areas of our results that call for additional comment. First, we have again seen that systematic processing has a positive relationship with risk perception while heuristic processing has an inverse relationship.This has been a consistent result across the set of studies we have done with this configuration of measures. In the context of this study, cluster investigations, the epidemiological investigations typically provide little or no evidence of statistically elevated cancer rates -and in many cases provided explanations for the rates that did exist. Given this nature of the scientific information, it may be that heuristic processing is linked to a scientific rationality, or simply faith in science. But an alternate perspective would emphasise those who used systematic strategies, and arguably gave the matter greater thought, arrived at a more critical conclusion that was not strictly based on scientific rationality, or faith in science. Clearly, these results may have relevance to understand the relationship between trust and risk perception since trust in science must play a critical role in many important contexts. Further investigation of this specific result is called for. We also saw that reporting greater trust for the industries and state health departments suppresses risk perceptions, while reporting greater trust for the civic groups associates with perceptions of greater risk. This clearly relates to the other observation that high trust in civic groups associates positively with systematic processing but negatively with heuristic processing, and vice versa for state and industry. This set of relationships appear to reinforce the valence mirroring effect of the processing modes on risk perception given that the industries and state health departments were advocating the scientifically based information while the civic groups were offering a challenge to that perspective. This set of results should be considered in concert with the observation offered above concerning the role of trust in science that is a critical component in a context such as this.
Some of the more intriguing results of this analysis reside in the mix of direct and indirect effects of trust, via information processing, on risk perception. The design of our study only allows us to offer speculative thoughts on this result. We might suggest that information must be transmitted for the formation of a perception of trust, and this must occur over a period of time as individuals assess the trustworthiness of a given institution or modify preconceptions (just as they do with individuals). But there is a segment of this process that we do not observe here. To examine how information moves from source to receiver may require additional intervening variables, perhaps starting with a look at mediated vs. interpersonal channels. Such a parsing of information flow might yield insight into how trust exerts its effect.
Turning to limitations of the study, it is first important to restate that respondents in this study were limited to those who had gained awareness of the cancer rate issue in their area. While this is defensible since we cannot analyse a non-perception or evaluate information processing that has not occurred, this clearly introduces a biasing effect by only representing a segment of the full population. A more elaborate design might have provided information for the individuals who were not as yet aware of the issue, and then examined their reactions.
We offer a few additional caveats as well. The directionality of the relationships depicted in our model is conditional, as must be the case in a cross-sectional design. Clearly, we can argue for reciprocity with trust affecting processing and processing affecting trust. While we have provisionally addressed this issue in our analysis, there is most likely some feedback involved as persons come to a judgment about risk. To address this question, experimental work might be undertaken to clarify the directionality of this relationship.We do note, however, that directionality between risk perception and information processing may be somewhat more clear because we asked respondents to report what their processing behavior had been prior to the perception measured at the time of data collection.
Also, as we discussed above, there is unaccounted error in the model. Much of the problem in measurement is located in the processing modes. Various researchers are working to address measurement issues with the HSM in field applications such as this. The model has been adapted from experimental work and some further development is clearly needed.
Also, the overall model would certainly be greatly improved if the trust measures were latent variables with multiple indicators. This is a significant shortcoming of the analysis, especially since so much of the literature on trust shows clearly that it is not a unidimensional concept. But the analysis we present here is exploratory in nature -our original project was not designed for this specific analysis. In future work, we plan to more fully develop and integrate multivariate measures of trust.
We would also like to see, in studies of this nature, some attention to the content of the information that is presented by various sources. In the cases we have examined, industries and health departments emphasised a 'no risk' message. Civic groups offered the opposite message. But a number of other elements of the messages sent by these sources are important and are unobserved here, such as the details of the scientific arguments, the statistical analyses, anecdotal evidence and emotional content. This study also does not provide specificity concerning the messages that individuals attended to. A more detailed study would make a linkage between specific messages (or message characteristics) and information processing.
Despite these limitations we are still guardedly positive of our results. The study of trust's function in risk is only in its early stages. We hope our results offer researchers some insight and a basis for additional investigation. This is an important overall project because the complicated circumstances in which the relationship between trust and risk is expressed present great challenges not only for researchers, but also for society.
